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FBI SURVEILLANCE: PAST AND PRESENT
Athan G. Theoharis
On January 29, 1979, police arrested seventy members of the
Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), formerly the Revolu-
tionary Union (RU), in Washington, D.C., at a demonstration pro-
testing the visit of the Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China,
Teng Xiao Ping. The RCP members were charged with assaulting po-
lice officers; seventeen of those arrested were eventually indicted. Their
case, however, never came to trial. Prosecutors dropped all charges
against six of those indicted. On June 3, 1982, the remaining defendants
and the prosecutors agreed to a plea bargain: ten of the defendants pled
guilty to two misdemeanor charges and, in return, the government
dropped the felony charges against them; in addition, the government
dropped all charges against RCP leader Robert Avakian. 1
The indictment of the eleven RCP leaders was not unprecedented.
Since the 1940s the federal government has sought to convict radical
activists on a variety of conspiracy charges. 2 Nonetheless, the RCP trial
has broader significance. Its importance derives from the release of doc-
uments by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the RCP during
discovery and in response to requests filed under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.3 These documents provide insights into past and current
FBI surveillance practices. The more important revelations pertain to
the scope of FBI break-ins during the 1970s, 4 the Reagan Administra-
tion guidelines governing FBI "domestic security/terrorism" investiga-
"* Professor of History, Marquette University. A.B. 1956, A.B. 1957, M.A. 1959, Ph.D.
1965, University of Chicago.
I United States v. Schiller, 424 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1980). The lengthy proceedings were
episodically covered by the Washington Post. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1979, at A1, col.
1; id Oct. 22, 1980, at A17, col. 3; id June 4, 1982, at A4, col. 4.
2 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d
165 (1st Cir. 1969). See general4y M. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH
ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977); D. CAUTE, THE
GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978).
The RCP indictments were distinctive in that the defendants were charged with violat-
ing a District of Columbia statute prohibiting rioting or inciting to riot and disorderly con-
duct, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1121, 22-1122 (1981), rather than a federal statute as in the
cases cited above.
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
4 See Marro, FBI Break-in Poli, in BEYOND THE HISS CASE: THE FBI, CONGRESS,
AND THE COLD WAR 78-128 (A. Theoharis ed. 1982) (describing of FBI domestic security
"break-ins" during 1970s to investigate Weather Underground).
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tions,5 and the targets of FBI "foreign intelligence" (formerly "domestic
intelligence") electronic surveillance.6 These documents demonstrate
that although the FBI may have quantitatively reduced its surveillance
activities during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the underlying criterion
governing earlier investigations-the political beliefs of the individual or
group-continues to shape the Bureau's current surveillance policy. 7
Although the FBI now rationalizes its surveillance activities under the
rubrics of "terrorism" and "foreign intelligence," these activities do not
seem substantively different from those it had justified in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s under the rubric of "subversive activities."8
FBI documents concerning investigation of the RCP suggest that
during the 1970s the FBI conducted more warrantless break-ins than its
officials had publicly admitted. Until April 1978, when the federal gov-
ernment indicted former Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, former
Acting FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt, and former FBI Assistant
Director Edward Miller for authorizing illegal break-ins during investi-
gations of the Weather Underground in the early 1970s,9 FBI officials
had consistently affirmed that the FBI had terminated "domestic secur-
ity" break-ins in 1966 pursuant to a directive from then FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover. 10 The indictments of Gray, Felt, and Miller, however,
confirmed that the FBI had employed break-ins in the FBI's post-1966
5 The guidelines issued on March 7, 1983, by Attorney General Smith are reprinted in
32 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3087 (1983).
6 See A. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOO-
VER TO THE HUSTON PLAN 94-120 (1978) (examining FBI electronic surveillance policy and
practice).
7 The Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice, the earliest predecessor
agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was created administratively in 1908. 28
U.S.C. § 531 note (1976). The FBI first assumed its domestic security role during the First
World War. See general4' F. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 30-51 (1980); W. PRES-
TON, ALIENS AND DISSENTERS 88-117 (1963). Although funding for the FBI was ostensibly
limited to prosecutions of federal crimes, see 28 U.S.C. § 531 note (1976), the FBI soon began
to investigate lawful political activities of citizens and resident aliens. These investigations
culminated in the "Palmer Raids of 1920." See F. Donner, supra, at 35-39; W. PRESTON, supra
208-37; Williams, The Bureau of Investigation and its Critics, 1919-1921: The Orgias of Federal
Political Surveillance, 68 J. Am. HIST. 560 (1981). The FBI has continued domestic political
surveillance to the present time. See generaly F. Donner, supra; A. Theoharis, supra note 6;
Williams, Thq Neyver Stopped Watching Us: FBI Political Surveillance 1924-1936, 2 U.C.L.A.
HIST. J. 5 (1981).
8 See, e.g., Donner, Intelligence on the Attack: The Terrorist as Scapegoat, 226 NATION 590,
591 (1978).
9 United States v. Gray, 502 F. Supp. 150, 150-51 (D.D.C. 1980).
10 See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVrIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 365 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMrrTEE REPORT]; A. THEOHARIS, supra
note 6, at 126-28. The Hoover directive referred only to "blackbag jobs"-the FBI term for
warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes other than the installation of electronic listening
equipment. SELECT COMMrr-rEE REPORT, supra, at 355 n.1. Hoover's directive did not ban
break-ins for the purpose of installing such equipment. Id at 365.
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investigation of the Weather Underground. One extant FBI document,
a December 1, 1972, airtel from Acting FBI Associate Director W. Mark
Felt to several FBI field office heads, known as Special Agents in Charge
(SAC)," moreover, records that the New York City agents conducting
the illegal Weather Underground break-ins had been acting under offi-
cial orders. In the airtel, Felt noted: "I am certain that you have taken
a personal interest in Weatherman fugitive cases in your office with the
result that the intensification required is being achieved and with the
further result that innovative techniques are beirig considered and imple-
mented."' 2 The government conceded during Felt's trial that the term
"innovative techniques" was an FBI euphemism for an order to conduct
break-ins.' 3
The documentation of the authorization of break-ins involving the
Weather Underground compelled FBI officials to revise earlier state-
ments in which they had claimed that break-ins ended in 1966. After
the indictments of Gray, Felt, and Miller, FBI officials conceded that
"domestic security" break-ins had continued beyond July 1966, but
maintained that the Weather Underground break-ins were atypical.
They asserted that they had employed these break-ins in response to the
Nixon Administration's obsessive concern with apprehending the
Weather Underground fugitives.14
11 Airtel from Acting FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt to FBI field office heads,
known as Special Agents-in-Charge (SAC) in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, New
York, San Francisco, and Seattle (Dec. 1, 1972, FBI 176-1594-3014) (on file at Comell Law
Review).
12 Id (emphasis added).
13 Cf Marro, supra note 4, at 101-02 ("The reporting of break-ins, such as it was, was
virtually in code, with such terms as 'special techniques' or 'sensitive investigative techniques'
used in place of a clear description of what had been done.").
14 A. THEOHARIS, supra note 7, at 128-29; Marro, supra note 4. The Nixon administra-
tion's obsession with antiwar radicals is underscored by the development of the so-called Hus-
ton Plan, which, had it been implemented, would have authorized the White House to
control and closely supervise intelligence investigations of leftist political activities. Nixon
and his senior advisers believed that, because of a lack of coordination and cooperation, the
intelligence agencies (the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security
Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) were not dealing effectively with
the antiwar movement. Nor, in the administration's opinion, were the intelligence agencies
aggressive enough. The "Huston Plan" called for NSA interception of the communications of
U.S. citizens through the use of international facilities, expanded electronic surveillance of
individuals and groups within the United States, removal of restrictions on mail coverage,
modifications of restrictions on surreptitious entries, and the use of military intelligence
agents to gather information on student-related dissident activities. SELECT COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, SUPRA note 10, at 945-54. The author of the plan, Tom Charles Huston, a presidential
assistant and former army intelligence officer, advised that some of the proposals were
"clearly illegal," but concluded that "the advantages to be derived from [their] use outweigh
the risks." Id at 954. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee investigating the
intelligence agencies (the "Church Committee'), Huston conceded that no objections were
ever raised by anyone within the administration or the intelligence agencies. 2 HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ActivrrIEs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975). For analyses of the
1984]
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FBI documents pertaining to the RCP suggest that the Weather
Underground break-ins of the 1970s were not atypical. During the Felt-
Miller trial, Gray had successfully maintained that he neither author-
ized, nor even knew about, the Weather Underground break-ins.' 5 Nev-
ertheless, the RCP documents indicate that authorization for these
break-ins had not come solely from Acting FBI Associate Director Felt,
but that Acting FBI Director Gray had authorized break-ins as well.
For example, on the bottom of a June 15, 1972, memorandum charac-
terizing the RU as a violent organization, Gray wrote: "[T]his is the
kind of extremist I want to go after HARD and with innooation. " 6 Gray
repeated this wording in a July 3, 1972, airtel, marked "personal atten-
tion," and sent to SACs in fourteen cities.1 7 The Acting FBI Director
continued:
There has been good informant penetration of the RU, but cov-
erage is not by any means sufficient in either quality or quantity. In a
number of instances, investigations relating to the RU and its mem-
bership have been delayed and reporting has been delinquent. Some
offices have not afforded investigation of the RU sufjiient imaginative
attention. Special Agents in Charge. . . must insure sufficient man-
power is afforded to the investigation of this organization, its member-
ship and activities as well as to developing well-placed informant
coverage. Insufficient investigation and delays in reporting will not
be tolerated.' 8
"Huston Plan," see F. DONNER, supra note 7, at 263-68 and A. THEOHARIS, supra note 6, at
13-39. The FBI's obsession with the "New Left" is evidenced by its use of aggressive and
illegal intelligence methods, known as "Cointelpro-New Left" (counterintelligence pro-
gram), to disrupt "New Left" political activities. See F. DONNER supra note 7, at 232-37; A.
THEOHARIS, supra note 6, at 147-50; Mackenzie, Sabotaging the Dissident Press, in THE CAM-
PAIGN AGAINST THE UNDERGROUND PRESS 159-70 (G. Rips. ed. 1981).
15 In December 1980, citing the apparent weakness of its evidence that Gray had ap-
proved unconstitutional break-ins against friends and relatives of Weatherman fugitives, the
Justice Department dropped criminal charges against the former Acting FBI Director. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1980, at Al, col. 5. A month earlier, ajury found defendants Felt and Miller
guilty of authorizing the illegal break-ins and fined them $5,000 and $3,500 respectively. Id,
Dec. 16, 1980, at Al, col. 5. In April 1981, however, President Ronald Reagan uncondition-
ally pardoned Felt and Miller, asserting that "the record demonstrates that they acted not
with criminal intent, but in the belief that they had grants of authority reaching to the high-
est levels of government." Id, April 16, 1981, at H22, col. 1. In response, John W. Nield, Jr.,
the chief prosecutor in the case, commented that "whoever is responsible for the pardons did
not read the record of the trial and did not know the facts of the case." Id, at Al, col. 1, A22,
col. 1.
16 Handwritten notation on memorandum from FBI Assistant Director Aj. Decker to
FBI Assistant Director Edward S. Miller (June 15, 1972) (emphasis added) (on file at Cornell
Law Review).
17 Airtel, from Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to SACs in Boston, Chicago, Cincin-
nati, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, Sacra-
mento, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle (July 3, 1972) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
18 Id (emphasis added).
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In a follow-up memorandum appraising the resultant FBI investigations
of the RU, Gray repeated this admonition:
All recipients [of this memorandum] insure investigation of the
RU and its members is being afforded sufficient manpower. Intensifed,
imaginative investigative effort must be applied to obtain member in-
formant coverage. Recommendations for any imaginative or unique ap-
proaches to this challenge, or to the over all investigation of the RU,
will be afforded careful consideration by the Bureau.19
FBI Supervisor David Ryan, Acting FBI Director Gray's principal aide,
and the author of the July 8, 1972, airtel written over Gray's signature,
later confirmed that Gray was contemplating the use of illegal break-ins
in the investigation of the RU. In 1980, during pretrial discovery in
ACLUv. Cio of Chicago,20 a suit brought to enjoin political surveillance
in the Chicago area by federal and local law enforcement agencies,
Ryan was deposed by ACLU attorney Douglas Cassel. Cassel asked
Ryan whether Gray's order to go after the RU "[h]ard and with innova-
tion" constituted "implicit authorization" to conduct break-ins given
the similarity between this language and the language of Felt's Decem-
ber 1, 1972, directive, which concededly authorized break-ins.21 Ryan
responded: "I think [Gray] was suggesting that all appropriate intelli-
gence and counter-intelligence techniques be used. This would include
19 Airtel from Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to SACs in Baltimore, Boston, Chi-
cago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Port-
land, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle (Oct. 24, 1972) (emphasis added)
(on file at Comell Law Review).
20 No. 75 C 3295 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 3, 1975). This case, together with another class
action suit, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74 C 3268 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov.
13, 1974), was settled when the parties entered into an agreement that barred the FBI and the
CIA from investigating and disrupting lawful political activity. In August 1981, the court
approved the proposed settlement and entered its order banning such investigations. Alliance
to End Represion v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 204-05 (N.D. Il1. 1981). In April 1983, a
month after Attorney General William French Smith issued new guidelines governing FBI
domestic intelligence investigations, see supra note 5, Federal District Judge Susan Getzendan-
ner permanently enjoined implementation in Chicago of the guideline that provided:
"When, however, statements advocate criminal activity . . . an investigation under these
Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or in the context
in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm." Alliance to End Re-
pression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 575, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The court found that the
new guidelines violated rights conferred by the settlement agreement because it would have
allowed the FBI to investigate persons solely because they advocated violence or other illegal
acts. Id at 577. The right to advocate illegal acts is guaranteed by the first amendment,
"'except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.'" Id at 578 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam)). The court found that the settlement agreement embraced
the principles of Brandenburg as the test for initiating investigations, 561 F. Supp. at 580, and
that the Smith guidelines "encourage violations [of the settlement agreement] by permitting
investigations to commence solely on the basis of a target's exercise of protected First Amend-
ment rights." Id at 577. For an examination of the Chicago settlement agreement, see Cas-
sel, Chicago FBI Settlement, FIRST PRINCIPLES, June 1981, at 1.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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certainly surreptitious entries. ' 22 Cassel then pressed Ryan as to what
he had intended to convey when reiterating the "innovation" phrase in
the July 3, 1972, airtel he had written under the Acting FBI Director's
signature.23 Ryan evasively responded: "I intended to convey the inter-
ests of the Acting Director. '24
The FBI's interest in the RCP-RU did not abate after 1972. The
FBI conducted later investigations more circumspectly because of the
changed political climate brought on by the Watergate scandal. Thus,
when approving a request from the head of the FBI's Chicago field of-
fice for an additional $1,000 payment to an informer targeted to infil-
trate the ROP, Gray's successor as FBI Director, Clarence Kelley added:
"Insure this informant is not maintaining duplicate copies or any type of
record of information informant is furnishing you." '25
This concern with safeguarding information concerning FBI inves-
tigations had previously led FBI officials to devise a series of filing proce-
dures designed to preclude the public discovery of the FBI's most
sensitive operations. 26 These separate filing procedures included the "Do
Not File" procedure for memoranda authorizing break-ins, and the
"JUNE mail" procedure for reports containing information obtained
from "sources illegal in nature" or other "highly sensitive sources,"
"such as Governors, secretaries to prominent officials discussing the offi-
cials and their attitudes. '27 "Do Not File" memoranda were not to be
serialized and were to be maintained in "office files" of FBI assistant
directors; "JUNE mail" documents also were not to be maintained in
the FBI's "central records system" but in the "Special File Room. ' 28
Thus, when responding to a court-ordered search for all electronic sur-
veillance records involving the RCP defendants, FBI Assistant Director
Robert Finzel stated that the required search had been conducted "to
the extent that such records have been indexed. ' 29
The FBI's attempt to minimize public awareness of its interest in
22 Deposition of FBI Supervisor David Ryan at 28, ACLU v. City of Chicago, No. 75 C
3295 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 3, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ryan Deposition]. Other FBI docu-
ments suggest that the RCP had been the target of FBI break-ins during the early 1970s; see,
in particular, Six FBI Photographs of the RCP's Chicago Headquarters Pinpointing the Lo-
cation in the Building and the Means of Access (on file at Comell Law Review).
23 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
24 Ryan Deposition, supra note 22, at 28.
25 Memorandum from FBI Director Clarence Kelley to SAC, Chicago (May 26, 1977)
(on file at Comell Law Review).
26 For fuller discussion of these and other FBI filing and record destruction procedures,
see Theoharis, In-House Cover-up: Researching FBIFiles, in BEYOND THE HIss CASE: THE FBI,
CONGRESS, AND THE COLD WAR 20 (A. Theoharis ed. 1982).
27 Id at 27-28.
28 Id at 21-22. Apparently, the FBI continues to maintain a separate filing system, not
part of the "central records system," for highly sensitive documents. Id at 34-35.
29 Memorandum from FBI Assistant Director Robert P. Finzel to Assistant United
States Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen (Nov. 2, 1981) (on file at Comell Law Review).
[Vol. 69:883
FBI SURVEILLANCE
the RCP was motivated in part by the institution of Attorney General
Edward Levi's restrictive guidelines governing FBI "domestic security"
investigations.30 The guidelines granted the FBI limited latitude to con-
duct "domestic security" investigations. The FBI could initiate "prelim-
inary" investigations on the basis of "allegations or other information
that an individual or a group may be engaged in activities which in-
volve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or
will involve the violation of federal law."' 31 The guidelines required the
FBI to conclude "preliminary" investigations within ninety days, and
confined the inquiry to verifying or refuting the allegation.3 2 The FBI
could not initiate a "full" investigation unless it obtained hard informa-
tion either at the outset or during "preliminary investigations." The
standards that Levi established for "full" investigations approximated a
probable violation of criminal law: full investigations "may only be au-
thorized on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities
which involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will
involve the violation of federal law." 33
Attorney General Levi accorded the Justice Department a greater
supervisory role over these investigations than had any previous attor-
ney general, requiring the Department's participation in determining
whether FBI investigations complied with these standards. He required
the Department of Justice to review "the results of full domestic intelli-
gence investigations at least annually, and . . . determine in writing
whether continued investigation [was] warranted. '34
The Levi guidelines applied only to "domestic security" investiga-
tions. Levi issued other, secret guidelines to govern FBI "foreign
counterintelligence" investigations.3 5 Initiation of foreign counterintel-
ligence investigations required some proof that the targeted individual
or group was an agent or was knowingly acting on behalf of an agent of
a foreign power, a less stringent standard than that required for "domes-
tic security" investigations. Even under this less stringent standard,
however, the FBI probably could conduct a full investigation of a
United States citizen or resident alien only "if there were reasonable
suspicion that he was a conscious member of a hostile foreign intelli-
gence network, and [the FBI] could seek approval for electronic surveil-
lance if there were probable cause that the [individual's] activities
involved clandestine transmission of information to a hostile intelligence
30 Attomr General's Guidelines for FBI Domestic Security Investigation, reprinted in J. ELLIFF,
THE REFORM OF FBI INTELIUGENCE OPERATIONS 196-202 (1979).
31 Id at 197.
32 Id at 197-98.
33 IA at 198.
34 Id at 200.




Neither the "domestic security" nor the "foreign counterintel-
ligence" standards of the Levi guidelines would have authorized an in-
vestigation of the RCP; it was not involved in concerted illegal or
overtly revolutionary activity, and was not associated with any foreign
country. 37 A March 14, 1979, FBI memorandum from the SAC of the
FBI's Pittsburgh field office conceded as much, reporting that investiga-
tion of the RCP had uncovered no evidence of the resort to "force or
violence . . . or the violation of Federal Law . . . for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government.1 38 Despite this finding, the Pittsburgh
SAC argued that "newly surfaced" RCP activities, such as demonstra-
tions against the Iranian government, underscored the need to modify
the Levi guidelines to permit full domestic security investigations of the
RCP. The Pittsburgh SAC suggested that the RCP's recent abstention
from the use of violence would be only a temporary phenomenon:
It is felt that such periods of quiescence followed by acts of violence or
other activities which violate U.S. Law or the U.S. Constitution are
not uncommon for the Communist Party organizations, and that provi-
sions for such activity should be made in the Attorney Generals guidelines to cover
such situations prior to violent and/or detrimental reactivations of such
organizations. 3 9
The Reagan Administration recently made provisions to rectify this
problem. On June 24, 1982, FBI Director William Webster announced
before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism that the
Justice Department was in the process of reviewing the Levi guide-
lines.4° Webster asserted that the proposed revisions were necessary to
enable the FBI to investigate "terrorist groups" that are "no different
from other criminal enterprises. ' 4 1 The setting of Webster's announce-
ment was fitting; since 1981 the chairperson of the Senate Subcommit-
tee, Jeremiah Denton, had been lobbying for revisions of the Levi
guidelines. Not surprisingly, then, Denton praised the proposed revi-
sions as permitting needed FBI investigations of radical organizations,
36 Id at 145.
37 A Maoist organization espousing revolutionary change, the RCP has not been con-
victed under any federal statute and was not targeted for a foreign counterintelligence investi-
gation under the Levi guidelines. The RCP has denounced both the Soviet and the current
Chinese Communist governments for their failure to espouse revolutionary change and for
repudiation of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
38 Memorandum from SAC, Pittsburgh, to FBI Director William Webster (Mar. 14,
1979, FBI 100-56839-293) [hereinafter cited as SAC Pittsburgh Memo] (citing an Apr. 5,
1978 FBI airtel) (on file at Comell Law Review). The investigation revealed that "the RCP
encouraged its members at one time to acquire weapons and engage in firearms training, but
discontinued this practice." Id
39 Id.




citing in particular the National Lawyers Guild, the Socialist Workers
Party, the Weather Underground, and the Progressive Labor Party.42
On March 7, 1983, Attorney General William French Smith issued
new, more permissive guidelines governing "domestic security/terrorism
investigations. '43 Abandoning a probable cause standard, the Smith
guidelines authorized such investigations "when the facts or circum-
stances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an
enterprise [to further] political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States."" The FBI should "anticipate or prevent
crime" by investigating statements that "advocate criminal activity or
indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of
violence." 45 Under the Smith guidelines, the FBI Director or designated
FBI Assistant Director can authorize "domestic security/terrorism" in-
vestigations for a 180-day period, 46 as compared to the 90-day period for
preliminary investigations under the Levi guidelines.47 The Smith
guidelines also enable these officials to reauthorize investigations beyond
this period.48 Furthermore, the Smith guidelines abandon the Levi re-
quirement that the Department of Justice review full investigations at
least annually and "determine in writing whether continued investiga-
tion is warranted. '49 Instead, the FBI need only "notify" the Justice
Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review whenever initiat-
ing a "domestic security/terrorism" investigation. 50 The guidelines did
not specify whether this notification must be in writing. The attorney
general's oversight role became discretionary: the attorney general
"may, as he deems necessary, request the FBI to prepare a report on the
status of the investigation."'5' In addition, the Smith guidelines author-
ize the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review to review at least annu-
ally only the results of FBI investigations, and do not empower it to
determine in writing whether continued investigation is warranted.52
The abandonment of any written authorization requirement under the
Smith guidelines for domestic security investigation is even more strik-
ing in view of the provisions governing "sensitive criminal" and "racke-
teering enterprise" investigations, which do require written
42 Id
13 Attorny General's Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, 32 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3087 [hereinafter cited as Smith Guidelines].
44 Id at 3091.
45 Id at 3088.
46 Id at 3092.
47 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48 Smith Guidelines, supra note 43, at 3092.
49 J. ELLIFF, supra note 30, at 200.
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authorization. 53
Notwithstanding the absence of a written authorization require-
ment for domestic security investigation, the Reagan Administration's
relaxation of FBI investigative guidelines did not reinstitute FBI polit-
ical surveillance. The FBI's electronic surveillance practices suggest that
radical organizations were already under FBI investigation. During
pretrial hearings in the aborted Washington trial, attorneys for the RCP
defendants filed motions requesting all records of government electronic
surveillance. The presiding Superior Court Judge granted these mo-
tions and directed government attorneys to produce affidavits responsive
to this inquiry.5 4 Government attorneys conceded the fact of electronic
surveillance, but claimed that it was legal and that the resultant records
need not be turned over to the defendants. 55 The government admitted
that the FBI overheard four of the eleven RCP defendants "on various
occasions during the course of foreign intelligence national security elec-
tronic surveillance. . . . [S]uch surveillance was authorized by the...
Attorney General prior to May 18, 1979 .... ,,56 The government fur-
ther admitted that the FBI had overheard one of the defendants, Robert
Avakian, "on numerous occasions during 1969 and 1970 on surveil-
lances authorized by the Attorney General for domestic intelligence pur-
53 Id. at 3088-91. Thus, during "preliminary inquiries" involving "sensitive criminal
matters" (i.e., "any alleged criminal conduct involving corrupt action by a public official or
political candidate, the activities of a foreign government, the activities of a religious organi-
zation or a primarily political organization or the related activities of any individual promi-
nent in such an organization, or the activities of the news media", id at 3088), "the United
States Attorney or an appropriate Department of Justice official shall be notified of the basis
for an inquiry as soon as practicable after the opening of the inquiry, and the fact of notifica-
tion shall be recorded in writing." Id at 3089.
The authorization and review standards for "racketeering enterprise" investigations are
even more stringent, reflecting an unwillingness to accord broad discretionary investigative
authority to the FBI:
A racketeering enterprise investigation may be authorized by the [FBI] Direc-
tor or designated Assistant Director upon a written recommendation setting
forth the facts and circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of a
racketeering enterprise whose activities involve violence, extortion, narcotics,
or systematic public corruption. In such cases the FBI shall notify the Attor-
ney General or his designee of the opening of the investigation. An investiga-
tion of a racketeering enterprise not involved in these activities may be
authorized only by the Director upon his written determination, concurred in
by the Attorney General, that such investigation is warranted by exceptional
circumstances.
Id at 3091.
54 United States v. Avakian, No. F-563-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1979) (order grant-
ing disclosure of electronic surveillance).
55 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government's Petition for Judicial Deter-
mination of the Legality of Certain Electronic Surveillance at 6-7, United States v. Avakian,
Misc. No. 82-0018 (D.D.C. filed) [hereinafter cited asAvakian Memorandum] (on file at Comell
Law Review).
56 Declaration of Donald B. Nicholson, Dep't of Justice Attorney, at 1-2, United States
v. Avakian, No. F-563-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1982) (on file at Comell Law Review).
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poses" 57 and that another defendant, Joseph Moore, was "monitored on
April 19, 1979, during a surveillance authorized by United States Dis-
trict Judge James B. Parsons . . .on January 29, 1979, for thirty days
and extended by the same judge for thirty-day periods on March 1, 1979
and March 30, 1979."58 The government argued that disclosure of the
electronic surveillance records "would be harmful to the national secur-
ity of the United States." 59 Judge John Lewis Smith upheld the govern-
ment's motion to suppress release of the electronic surveillance records
on February 23, 1982.60
Judge Smith's February 1982 ruling and Judge Parsons's January
.1979 authorization of electronic surveillance suggest that the courts are
unduly deferential to the government's national security claims.61 RCP
members were targets of the government's 1969-1970 "domestic intelli-
gence" investigations and "foreign intelligence national security" elec-
tronic surveillance in 1979. In view of the RCP's bitter opposition to the
political leadership of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China, electronic surveillance of RCP members is not reasonably
likely to yield useful foreign intelligence information. It appears that
the courts failed to ask the threshold question of whether an investiga-
tion of this small and isolated radical organization might produce intel-
ligence or foreign counterintelligence information.
Apparently, RCP members have been, and under the Smith guide-
lines will be again, investigated because of their radical political activi-
ties. The released FBI documents reflecting the nature of FBI electronic
surveillance practices, the suggestions of the scope of FBI break-ins dur-
ing the 1970's, and the rationale for modifying the Levi guidelines in the
light of the permissive standards of the Smith guidelines, demonstrate
the need for a tightly worded FBI legislative charter. 62 This charter
57 Declaration of Michael E. Davitt, Dep't of Justice Paralegal, at 2, United States v.
Avakian, No. F-563-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1982) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
58 Id
59 Avakian Memorandum, supra note 55, at 5.
60 United States v. Avakian, No. 82-0018 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1982) (order declaring sur-
veillance legal).
61 Although Congress has revised foreign intelligence electronic surveillance procedures
since Judge Parsons' January, 1979, order, judicial deference to claims of national security
persists. On October 24, 1978, President Carter signed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) into law. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (Supp. V 1982). FISA established a Foreign
Intelligence ,Surveillance Court to review requests by the National Security Agency and the
FBI, the only two agencies affected by the law, for permission to conduct foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance. Through August 1981, the court had approved all but one request
submitted by the Attorney General. J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON
AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY 367-74 (1982).
62 Although Congress has not begun serious consideration ofan FBI charter bill, some of
its members have expressed concern over the breadth of the Smith guidelines. The House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, chaired by Congressman Don Edwards,
held hearings on these guidelines. Edwards argued that the Levi guidelines were "instrumen-
1984]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
must not only detail the parameters of FBI investigative authority but
must also prohibit the FBI's creation of separate filing procedures, and
require that the attorney general review and authorize in writing FBI
investigative techniques and procedures.63
tal in curtailing intelligence abuse by the FBI," and should not be changed "without careful
Congressional and public scrutiny to assure that [the Smith guidelines are] not a retreat."
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1983, at 8, col. 6.
On May 11, 1983, the House Committee on the judicary reported to the House a $3.4
billion justice Department authorization bill permitting the FBI to use the Smith guidelines
until September 30, 1983, but requiring readoption of the Levi guidelines from October 1,
1983, through January 1, 1984. This restriction was not adopted where the House approved
the Department's appropriations for 1984. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1983, at B10, col. 1.
63 The American Civil Liberties Union, The Committee for Public justice, and the
Center for National Security Studies have proposed an FBI charter that incorporates many of
these proposals. Members of the drafting committee included Morton Halperin, Professors
Thomas I. Emerson, Paul Chevigny, and Charles Nesson. See also The Committee on Federal
Legislation, A Charterfor the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 35 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 302 (1980),
for an analysis of one of the proposed charter bills, S. 1612, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. 21,506-12 (1979), in the Senate and H.R. 5030, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Legisla-
tive Charter for the FBI- Hearings on the HR. 5030 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciar, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979-80), in the House,
which was introduced on July 31, 1979.
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